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Abstract—We have witnessed rapid advances in both face
presentation attack models and presentation attack detection
(PAD) in recent years. Compared to widely studied 2D face
presentation attacks (e.g. printed photos and video replays),
3D face presentation attacks are more challenging because face
recognition systems (FRS) is more easily confused by the 3D
characteristics of materials similar to real faces. Existing 3D
face spoofing databases, mostly based on 3D facial masks, are
restricted to small data size and suffer from poor authenticity due
to the difficulty and expense of mask production. In this work,
we introduce a wax figure face database (WFFD) as a novel and
super-realistic 3D face presentation attack. This database con-
tains 2300 image pairs (totally 4600) and 745 subjects including
both real and wax figure faces with high diversity from online
collections. On one hand, our experiments have demonstrated the
spoofing potential of WFFD on three popular FRSs. On the other
hand, we have developed a multi-feature voting scheme for wax
figure face detection (anti-spoofing), which combines three dis-
criminative features at the decision level. The proposed detection
method was compared against several face PAD approaches and
found to outperform other competing methods. Surprisingly, our
fusion-based detection method achieves an Average Classification
Error Rate (ACER) of 11.73% on the WFFD database, which is
even better than human-based detection.
Index Terms—Wax figure face, presentation attack detection,
face recognition, biometrics spoofing, anti-spoofing.
I. INTRODUCTION
FACE has been one of the most widely-used biometricsmodalities due to its accuracy and convenience for per-
sonal verification and identification. However, the increasing
popularity and easy accessibility of face modalities also makes
face recognition systems (FRS) a major target of spoofing such
as presentation attack [1]. This kind of security threats can
be easily performed by presenting the FRS a face artifact,
which is also known as presentation attack instrument (PAI)
in the ISO standard [2]. A recent breach of biometrics database
(BioStar) leads to the compromise of as many as 28 million
record containing facial recognition and fingerprint data, which
can be easily exploited as PAIs by malicious hackers.
Based on the way of generating face artifacts, face pre-
sentation attacks can be classified into 2D modalities (e.g.,
printed/digital photographs or recorded videos on mobile
devices such as a tablet) and 3D type (e.g., by wearing a
mask or presenting a synthetic model). Existing systems and
research on face recognition pay more attention to 2D face
PAI due to its simplicity, efficiency, and low cost. However,
as material science and 3D printing advance, creating face
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Fig. 1. Examples of 3D presentation attack cases. (a) Airport security system
fooled by silicon mask 1, (b) Android phones fooled by a 3D-printed head2,
(c) iPhone X face ID unlocked by a 3D mask3.
like 3D structures or materials has become easier and more
affordable. When compared against the 2D modalities, 3D
face presentation attacks are more realistic and therefore more
difficult to be detected. The class of 3D face presentation
attacks includes wearing wearable facial masks [3], building
3D facial models [4], through make-up [5], and using plastic
surgery. Fig. 1 shows several examples of 3D presentation
attacks, which have successfully fooled some widely used FRS
such as in airport and phones.
Existing research on 3D face presentation attacks focuses
more on easy-to-make facial masks. 3D facial mask spoofing
had been previously thought of impossible to become a
common practice in the literature [6] because 3D masks were
deemed much more difficult and expensive to manufacture
(e.g., requiring special 3D devices and materials). However,
rapid advances in 3D printing technologies and services have
made it easier and cheaper to make 3D masks recently.
Several 3D mask attack databases have already been created,
including 3D Mask Attack Database (3DMAD) [3], 3D-face
spoofing database (3DFS-DB) [7], HKBU 3D Mask Attack
with Real World Variations Database (HKBU-MARs) [8],
Silicone Mask Attack Database (SMAD) [9], and Wide Multi
Channel Presentation Attack database (WMCA) [10].
These 3D face presentation attack databases have collected
different 3D masks from the third-party services [3], [8],
self-manufacturing [7], or online resources [9]. However,
the databases are restricted to small data sizes (mostly less
than 30 subjects), low mask qualities (some are not user
customized [9], [11]), low diversity in lighting conditions,
facial poses and recording devices. These restrictions will
greatly limit not only the attack abilities of fake faces but also
the validity of research findings about detection performance
1Picture is downloaded from https://chameleonassociates.com/security-
breach/.
2Picture is downloaded from http://www.floridaforensicscience.com/broke-
bunch-android-phones-3d-printed-head/.
3Picture is downloaded from https://boingboing.net/2010/11/05/young-
asian-refugee.html.
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Fig. 2. Photos with wax figure faces for fraud4. (a) with the wax figure of
Hong Kong chief executive Donald Tsang Yam-Kuen, (b) with the wax figure
of Hong Kong business tycoon Li Ka-Shing.
against 3D presentation attacks.
To address these limitations, we propose to take advantage
of the popularity and publicity of numerous celebrity wax
figure museums in the world, and collect a large number
of wax figure images to create a new Wax Figure Face
Database (WFFD). These life-size wax figure faces are all
carefully designed and made in clay with wax layers, silicone
or resin materials, so that they are super-realistic and similar to
real faces. With the development of wax figure manufacture
technologies and services, we believe easily obtainable and
super-realistic wax figure faces will pose threat to the existing
face recognition systems. In fact, the wax figure faces have
already been used for identity personation and fraud in real
life. In 2012, using photos taken with the wax figures at Hong
Kongs Madam Tussauds Museum (as shown in Fig. 2), six
suspects snapped about 600,000 people out of nearly US$475
million under a pyramid sales scam by claiming that their
company was supported by Hong Kong chief executives and
business tycoons.
In this paper, we introduce these wax figure faces as a
more challenging type of 3D face presentation attack and
analyze their impact on face recognition systems. The main
contributions of this work are summarized below.
• The new WFFD database is constructed. It consists of
2300 images acquired from 745 subjects (with both real
and wax figure faces, totally 4600 faces), which are
diversified in terms of age, ethnicity, pose, expression,
environment, and cameras. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first large-scale wax figure face database
and it has not been proposed as super-realistic 3D face
presentation attacks in the open literature.
• Three classes of discriminative features, including those
learned from SqueezeNet and ResNet-50, and multi-block
LPQ (Local Phase Quantization) texture feature, are ex-
tracted for wax figure face presentation attack detection.
In view of their complementary nature, different feature
fusion schemes are explored and compared. In particular,
a novel multi-feature voting framework based on decision
level fusion is proposed and its effectiveness is verified.
• We have conducted extensive experiments on the WFFD
to justify its strong attack (spoofing) ability on three
popular face recognition systems and several face PAD
4Picture is downloaded from http://www.szdaily.com/content/2012-
03/26/content 6594713.htm.
methods. The effectiveness of the proposed wax figure
face detection (anti-spoofing) method is also demon-
strated with comparison to previous state-of-the-art and
human-based detection methods.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we briefly review related research in 3D face presentation
attack databases and PAD methods. The new WFFD database
and three newly designed protocols are introduced in Section
III. Section IV presents the proposed multi-feature voting
detection scheme, and experimental results are reported in
Section V. Finally, we make several conclusions about this
work and future research in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Spoofing: 3D face presentation attack databases
Existing 3D face presentation attack databases create attacks
mainly based on wearable 3D face masks that are made
of materials with face characteristics similar to real faces.
3DMAD [3] is the first publicly available 3D mask database. It
used the services of ThatsMyFace5 to manufacture 17 masks
of users, and recorded 255 video sequences with an RGB-
D camera of Micsoft Kinect device for both real access and
presentation attacks. This database has been widely used since
it provides not only color images and depth images but also
manually annotated eye positions for all face samples.
With the development of 3D modeling and printing tech-
nologies, more mask databases have been created since 2016.
3DFS-DB [7] is a self-manufactured and gender-balanced 3D
face spoofing database, in which 26 printed models were
made using two 3D printers: the ShareBot Pro and the
CubeX6, which are relatively low-cost and worth about 1,000
and 2,000C, respectively. HKBU-MARs [8] is another 3D
mask spoofing database with more variations to simulate real
world scenarios. It generated 12 masks from two companies
(ThatsMyFace and REAL-F7) with different appearance qual-
ities. A total of 1008 videos were created with 7 camera
types and 6 lighting settings. To include more subjects, SMAD
database [9] has collected and compiled videos of people
wearing silicone masks from online resources. It contains 65
genuine access videos of people auditioning, interviewing, or
hosting shows, and 65 attacked videos of people wearing a
complete 3D (but not customized) mask which fits well with
proper holes for the eyes and mouth.
Besides, there have been some 3D mask spoofing databases
with special lighting information for more effective detection.
The BRSU Skin/Face/Spoof Database [12] provides multi-
spectral SWIR (Short Wave Infrared) of four wavebands and
RGB color images incorporating various types of masks and
facial disguises. It contains 137 subjects and considers two
face presentation attack scenarios: disguise of the own identity
and counterfeiting of a foreign identity with a mask made of
silicon, plastic, latex or hard resin materials.
5http://thatsmyface.com/.
6https://www.sharebot.it. and http://www.cubify.com.
7http://real-f.jp/en the-realface.html.
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The MLFP database [11] (Multispectral Latex Mask based
Video Face Presentation Attack database) is another multispec-
tral database for face presentation attacks using latex and paper
masks. It contains 1350 videos of 10 subjects in visible, near
infrared (NIR), and thermal spectrums, which are captured at
different locations (indoor and outdoor) in an unconstrained
environment. The ERPA database [13] provides the RGB and
NIR images of both bona fide and 3D mask attack presenta-
tions captured using special cameras. This is a small dataset
with only 5 subjects involved; the depth information is also
available. Both rigid resin-coated masks and flexible silicone
masks are considered. Similarly, the recently released WMCA
database [10] also used multiple capturing devices/channels,
including color, depth, thermal and infrared. It contains 1679
videos with 347 bonafide and 1332 attacks from 72 subjects. A
variety of 2D and 3D presentation attacks are included. For the
3D face attacks, it used fake head, rigid mask, flexible silicone
masks, and paper masks and produced totally 709 videos.
These databases have played a significant role in designing
multiple detection schemes against 3D face presentation at-
tacks. However, they face the problems of small database size
(mostly less than 30 subjects), poor authenticity (some based
on paper or using noncustomized masks [9], [11]), or low
diversity in subject and recording process, which will certainly
limit the development of effective and practical PAD schemes.
B. Anti-spoofing: 3D face PAD methods
Detection of 3D fake faces is often more challenging than
detecting fake faces with 2D planar surfaces. Existing PAD
methods for 3D face presentation attacks are mainly based
on the difference between real face skin and mask materials,
which can be broadly classified into five categories- namely,
reflectance based, texture based, shape based, liveness based,
and deep features based.
Earlier studies [14], [15], [16], [12] in 3D mask spoofing
detection were based on the reflectance difference of facial
skins and mask materials. For example, the distribution of
albedo values for illumination of various wavelengths was
first analyzed in [14] to find how different facial skins and
mask materials (silicon, latex, and skinjell) behave in terms of
reflectance. Then a 2D feature vector consisting of two average
radiance values under 850nm (to distinguish between skins
and mask materials) and 685nm (to distinguish different facial
skin colors) was constructed. Using Fishers linear discriminant
(FLD) classifier, this method [14] achieved 97.78% accuracy
in fake face detection on their own experimental data.
Texture based methods explore the texture pattern difference
of real faces and masks with the help of texture feature
descriptors, such as the widely used Local Binary Patterns
(LBP) [17], [18], [19], [3], the Binarized Statistical Image
Features (BSIF) [20], [21], and Haralick features [22]. These
methods are easy to implement, but their robustness to dif-
ferent mask spoofing attacks calls for further investigations.
For example, different LBP features were tested in [8] on
their proposed database (HKBU-MARs), and it was found that
LBP based methods can not generalize well when confronting
different mask appearance.
Shape based 3D mask PAD methods use shape descrip-
tors [23], [24], [25] or 3D reconstruction [26] to extract
discriminative features from faces and 3D masks. Different
from reflectance-based or texture-based detection methods,
these schemes only requires standard color images without the
need of special sensors. However, their detection performances
rely on the 3D mask attack qualities, and may not be roust to
super-realistic 3D face presentation attacks.
More recently, some methods explore liveness cues to detect
3D face presentation attacks, such as thermal signatures [13],
gaze information [27], [28], [29], and pulse or heartbeat
signals [30], [31], [32], [33]. Based on the intrinsic liveness
signals, these methods achieve an outstanding performance on
distinguishing real faces from masks.
Instead of extracting hand-crafted features, deep feature
based methods automatically extract features from face im-
ages. Two deep representation approaches were investigated
in [34] for detecting spoofing in different biometric modalities.
Image quality cues (Shearlet) and motion cues (dense optical
flow) were fused in [35] using a hierarchical neural network
for mask spoofing detection, which achieved a half total error
rate(HTER) of 0% on the 3DMAD database. A network based
on transfer learning using a pre-trained VGG-16 model archi-
tecture is presented in [36] to recognize photo, video and 3D
mask attacks. Based on the observation with the importance
of dynamic facial texture information, a deep convolutional
neural network based approach was developed in [37]. Both
intra-dataset and cross-dataset evaluation on 3DMAD and their
supplementary dataset indicated the efficiency and robustness
of the proposed method. Overall, deep learning based methods
are not only efficient in spoof detection but also capable of
recognizing different face presentation attacks.
III. THE WAX FIGURE FACE DATABASE
To address the weaknesses in existing 3D face presentation
attack databases, we introduce a novel super-realistic Wax
Figure Face Database (WFFD) with a large size and diversity
in this paper. We will elaborate on the data collection process
and the design of evaluation protocols related to WFFD in this
section.
A. Data collection
The images collected in the WFFD are based on numerous
celebrity wax figure images from online resources. These
user-customized and life-size wax figure faces are carefully
designed and made in clay with wax layers, silicone or resin
materials, so that they are super-realistic. We first downloaded
as many celebrity wax figure faces as possible, and then
collected the corresponding celebrity images as real access
attempts. For each subject, the wax figure face and real face
were finally grouped in one image to make a clear comparison,
as the examples shown in Fig. 3(a). In total, 1000 images were
collected from 462 subjects.
Furthermore, we emphasize one particularly challenging
scenario where the wax figure face and real person face were
recorded together. Such scenario is only possible when the
celebrities attended the unveiling of their own wax figures,
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 3. Image examples in the WFFD database. (a) Grouped manually, (b)
recorded in the same scenario.
as shown in Fig. 3(b). Nevertheless, we have collected a
total of 1300 images from 409 subjects for this challenging
scenario. With the same recording environment and identical
facial poses and expressions, these images are more difficult
to distinguish even for humans.
B. Protocol design
Overall, WFFD consists of 2300 images and 4600 faces
from both real and wax figure faces of 745 subjects. Inspired
by the fraud incident shown in Fig. 2, we have further designed
three situational protocols to evaluate the performance of face
PAD methods on this database.
1) Protocol I: heterogeneous. This protocol contains images
which are grouped manually. Since the wax figure face and real
face are recorded from different devices and environmental
conditions (e.g., lighting conditions), humans can make use of
such subtle difference to distinguish the wax figure from the
real face.
2) Protocol II: homogeneous. Images in this protocol record
the wax figure face and real face in the same environment with
the same camera. This situation is often challenging even for
humans to tell wax figure apart from the real person.
3) Protocol III: mixed test. The previous two protocols are
combined to simulate real-world operational conditions. Note
that with rapid advance in AI technology, it is possible to
change the differing background in protocol I to make them
appear “homogeneous” by image matting [38].
In each protocol, images are grouped into three non-
overlapped subsets: training, validation and testing. More
details about the statistics of images in each protocol are
shown in Table III-B.
TABLE I
DETAILS OF EACH PROTOCOL IN THE WFFD
Protocol
#Image
#Face #SubjectTrain Valid Test Total
Protocol I 600 200 200 1000 2000 462
Protocol II 780 260 260 1300 2600 409
Protocol III 1380 460 460 2300 4600 745
Note that the train, validation, and test subsets are non-overlapped.
C. Statistics
The statistics information of subject gender, age, ethnicity
(detected by Face++ [39]), and face resolution (cropped by
the dlib face detector [40]) in the WFFD is shown in Fig. 4.
It can be seen that images in the WFFD are relatively gender
balanced - with about 60% of male and 40% of female in
both protocols. The ethnicity distribution in Fig. 4(b) contains
a majority of White subjects (around 60%), followed by about
20% Asians and 10% Blacks, and a small percentage of
Indians (no more than 2%). We can also see a wide distribution
of age in Fig. 4(c). The two protocols have similar distribution
patterns in terms of age, with half subjects being between 30
and 50 years old.
Although the dimensions of most face regions are between
100 × 100 and 500 × 500, there is a big difference in the
distribution between the two protocols. Matched and grouped
manually, the dimensions of face regions in Protocol I are
generally larger than those in Protocol II. Additionally, images
in Protocol I are more diversified in terms of subject pose,
facial expression, recording environment and devices than
those in Protocol II. In summary, when compared with other
3D face presentation attack databases (as shown in Table II),
our WFFD enjoys several advantages including large size,
super reality and high diversity.
Fig. 4. Statistical distribution of the WFFD. (a) Gender, (b) ethnicity, (c) age,
(d) face resolution.
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TABLE II
COMPARISON OF 3D FACE PRESENTATION ATTACK DATASETS
Database Year #Subject #Sample Format Material Description
3DMAD [3] 2013 17 255 video paper, hard resin 2D color images + 2.5D depth maps
3DFS-DB [7] 2016 26 520 video plastic 2D, 2.5D images + 3D information
HKBU-MARs [8] 2016 12 1008 video / color images
BRSU [12] 2016 137 141 image silicon, plastic,resin, latex multispectral SWIR, color images
SMAD [9] 2017 / 130 video silicone color images, from online resources
MLFP [11] 2017 10 1350 video latex, paper visible, NIR, thermal images
ERPA [13] 2017 5 86 image resin, silicone RGB, thermal, NIR images + depth
WMCA [10] 2019 72 1679 video rigid, silicone, paper multiple channels of 2D, 3D attacks
WFFD (proposed) 2019 745 2300 image wax figure color images, realistic, from online resources
IV. PROPOSED METHOD
For the proposed color image based WFFD database, de-
tection methods using reflectance properties, shape analysis,
and liveness cues are simply not applicable. To distinguish
wax figure faces from real faces, we have developed a multi-
feature voting scheme based on deep learning models and
texture descriptors. The overall scheme is decomposed of two
steps: multi-feature detection and decision-level voting, which
will be elaborated next.
A. Mutli-feature detection
Based on our previous work in [41], we have found deep
learning based methods are effective on discovering powerful
feature representations for not only 2D face presentation
attacks but also wax figure face detection. Based on this
observation, two pre-trained deep neural networks are used to
provide complementary and robust features for anti-spoofing
purpose. One is based on the SqueezeNet [42], [43]. It is
mainly comprised of Fire modules, which consist of a squeeze
convolution layer with only 1x1 filters, feeding into an expand
layer that has a mix of 1x1 and 3x3 convolution filters (as
shown in Fig. 5(a)). Fire modules and several pooling layers
are then stacked to form a small network with reasonably high
accuracy. The other is based on ResNet-50 [44]. Deep Residual
Networks (ResNets) are constructed by stacking residual units
(see Fig. 5(b)). Thanks to the identity function introduced
to the network, the gradient calculation in back-propagation
can flow more effectively, which helps alleviate the notori-
ous vanishing gradient problem [45]. Indeed, ResNet-50 has
excellent capability of discovering discriminative features and
distinguishing fake faces from real ones [46], [47], [48].
Due to the limited size of face presentation attack databases,
it is often difficult to train a deep architecture from the scratch.
Similar to previous works [10], [43], [36], [46], we propose to
transfer the two deep neural networks (pre-trained using the
celebrated ImageNet dataset) to fit the target database. They
were fine-tuned on the training face images by the proposed
WFFD database to avoid model overfitting. We first detect
and resize all face images to 227 × 227 for SqueezeNet and
224× 224 for ResNet-50 network as inputs. Formulating face
PAD as a binary classification problem, we have removed
(a) (b)
Fig. 5. Building blocks in the two network architectures. (a) Fire module in
SqueezeNet, (b) Residual learning in ResNet-50.
the networks’ output layer of 1,000 classes and obtained
1,000 dimensional output features of SqueezeNet (the feature
dimension is 2,048 for ResNet-50). Then the features were fed
into a Softmax classifier using cross-entropy loss function for
optimization.
To further improve the detection accuracy, we have consid-
ered the inclusion of a traditional texture descriptor, namely
multi-block local phase quantization (MB-LPQ), to character-
ize the intrinsic disparities in the color space of faces. Thanks
to the discriminative power of local texture description, MB-
LPQ has shown good performance in distinguishing real faces
from artifacts in the literature [41], [43], [49]. In this work,
we suggest that MB-LPQ is complementary to the two deep
learning based features for wax figure face detection (which
will be verified in the experiments in Section V). Taking the
resized 64 × 64 face images as inputs, this feature detector
converts standard RGB images into YCbCr color space and
divides them into multiple blocks. The LPQ features extracted
from each block are then concatenated to form the MB-
LPQ feature vector, which is fed into a Softmax classifier for
making the final prediction (real or fake).
B. Decision-level voting
The idea of combining classifiers dated back to [50]. There
are several ways of fusing the classification results - e.g.,
sum rule and majority voting. To exploit complementary
features in our design, we propose a multi-feature voting
scheme based on fusion at the decision level. Anti-spoofing
detection labels predicted by two deep learning (SqueezeNet
and ResNet-50) models are compared first. If they are the
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY 6
Fig. 6. Block diagram of the proposed detection scheme. Dashed lines indicate the optional process, which are performed only when ‘label compare’ outputs
‘different’.
same, the consistent result will be directly output as the final
predicted label; otherwise, different prediction results will
be combined with the MB-LPQ feature detection result for
further voting. The majority voting result of three competing
models will be declared as the label of final prediction. The
overall framework of the proposed multi-feature detection and
combination scheme is shown in Fig. 6.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we first demonstrate the attack ability of the
introduced WFFD database by investigating the vulnerability
of three popular face recognition systems to super-realistic 3D
presentation attacks. Then the proposed multi-feature voting
detection scheme is evaluated and compared with both human-
based detection and several popular face PAD methods. Fi-
nally, we explore and analyze the failure cases of different
anti-spoofing detection schemes.
A. Evaluation metrics
All experimental results were reported based on the
ISO/IEC 30107-3 metrics [2]. For the evaluation of vulnera-
bility across different FRSs, the Impostor Attack Presentation
Match Rate (IAPMR) metric was used. This metric has been
widely used as an indicator of attack success probability if
the FRS is evaluated against its PAD capabilities. It is defined
by the proportion of impostor attack presentations using the
same PAI species in which target reference is matched in a
full-system evaluation of verification systems. For detection
performance evaluation, we will calculate three types of errors
- i.e., Attack Presentation Classification Error Rate (APCER),
Bona Fide Presentation Classification Error Rate (BPCER),
and Average Classification Error Rate (ACER).
B. Vulnerabilities of face recognition systems
Three popular FRSs were considered in our experiments
to demonstrate their vulnerability against fake/spoofing faces
using the proposed WFFD database. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this is the first study about the attack abilities of the
super-realistic database on these popular FRSs. They are two
publicly available FRSs: OpenFace [51] and Face++ [39], and
a commercial system Neurotechnology VeriLook SDK [52].
Using the thresholds recommended by these FRSs, we have
calculated the IAPMR values on three protocols of the WFFD,
as presented in Table III.
TABLE III
IAPMR OF THREE FACE RECOGNITION SYSTEMS
Protocol Openface Face++ VeriLook
Threshold 0.99* 1e-5† 36**
Protocol I 93.20% 91.79% 76.14%
Protocol II 96.85% 96.22% 87.96%
Protocol III 95.26% 94.30% 81.75%
* Using a squared L2 distance threshold; †Using the confidence
threshold at the 0.001% error rate; ** Using the matching score
when FAR=0.1%.
As shown in Table III, over 91% of the images in the
three protocols of the WFFD were successfully matched while
using Openface or Face++, which implies the high attack
success rates of the proposed WFFD. Meantime, lower values
of IAPMR can be observed for the VeriLook SDK. This is
attributed to the fact that some wax figure faces with low
qualities or special poses cannot be identified by the VeriLook
SDK. However, we note that VeriLook tends to produce less
successful matches than the other two even for real faces (refer
to Fig. 7).
In addition, by comparing the results between Protocol I and
Protocol II, we can observe that higher matching rates were
achieved for images in Protocol II (homogeneous). This is
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because FRSs are more easily fooled when fake faces and real
faces are recorded by the same camera and even with identical
facial expressions and poses. Such findings with IAPMR of
> 96% suggest that super-realistic WFFD could pose severe
threat to existing FRSs without taking presentation attacks
into account. We have also compared the IAPMR values with
the actual matching rates using real to real faces in Fig. 7.
It can be seen that the matching rates using the wax figure
faces to real faces are close to those using real to real faces
for Openface and Face++ systems, which justifies the high
fidelity of proposed WFFD. The gap between wax to real and
real to real face matching is slightly larger for the VeriLook
SDK system, which implies that anti-spoofing capability is an
overlooked performance metric in the existing FRSs.
C. Detection performance of the proposed PAD scheme
Built upon three discriminative features, we want to demon-
strate the effectiveness of fusion in detecting wax figure faces
from real ones on the WFFD dataset. In our experiments, three
different fusion schemes, including the feature-level fusion,
score-level fusion, and decision-level fusion, were compared
along with the proposed multi-feature voting method (refer to
Fig. 6). The overall comparison results in terms of the ACER
are shown in Table IV.
It can be seen that without any fusion, the learned features
from SqueezeNet model achieved the lowest ACER of 15.33%
for Protocol III, indicating the best discriminative power in
detecting wax figure faces. Combining the two features learned
from SqueezeNet and ResNet-50 models at the feature or
score level (based on the sum rule) slightly improves the
performance; further combining them with MB-LPQ features
results in lower ACERs, reaching around 11.73% for Protocol
III. Overall, decision level fusion of the three features showed
the best results. Specifically, when compared against direct
fusion at the decision level, the proposed scheme can achieve
the lowest ACERs for all three protocols also with lower com-
putational cost due to the multi-voting strategy. Meanwhile, we
can observe that for most fusion schemes, the error rates in the
Protocol II were higher that those in the Protocol I, suggesting
that detecting the wax figure faces from real faces recorded in
the homogeneous case is the most challenging.
Fig. 8 shows the APCER and BPCER performance of
different fusion schemes under three protocols of WFFD
dataset. It can be observed from Fig. 8(a) that the detection
performance (including both APCER and BPCER values)
changed little for different fusion schemes under Protocol I.
However, under the more challenging Protocol II in Fig. 8(b),
all competing fusion schemes achieved higher BPCER than
APCER. This suggests that more real faces were incorrectly
classified as wax figure faces when they were homologous.
Further, feature-level fusion leads to lower BPCER (around
20%) while score-level fusion and decision-level fusion lead
to lower APCER values (around 10%). Similar trends can be
observed in Fig. 8(c) under the comprehensive Protocol III.
Overall, due to the high fidelity and large diversity of wax
figure faces in WFFD, distinguishing wax faces from real
faces is challenging especially for the homogeneous situation
TABLE IV
COMPARISON RESULTS (ACER) OF DIFFERENT FUSION SCHEMES
Fusion method Feature
Protocol
I
Protocol
II
Protocol
III
Single feature
F1-SqueezeNet 16.25 14.61 15.33
F2-ResNet-50 19.75 20.57 19.02
F3-MB-LPQ 17.50 31.35 22.28
Feature level
F1 & F2 15.00 16.35 14.67
F1 & F3 16.00 17.31 15.11
F2 & F3 13.50 19.42 15.54
F1 & F2 & F3 14.75 15.38 13.70
Score level
F1 & F2 16.25 15.38 15.00
F1 & F3 16.00 20.38 18.26
F2 & F3 16.75 22.50 19.67
F1 & F2 & F3 12.75 15.96 12.83
Decision level
F1 & F2 & F3 11.28 14.23 12.00
Proposed: F1 &
F2 (&F3)
11.25 13.65 11.73
(Protocol II). By exploiting the the complement property
among different features, the proposed multi-voting fusion
scheme has achieved the lowest APCER of 7.8% and the
lowest BPCER of around 15%.
D. Comparison against other PAD methods
Several face PAD methods were evaluated and compared
on the WFFD database to show how they can work for
super-realistic 3D presentation attacks. These PAD methods
have achieved promising performance in detecting 2D type
or 3D mask presentation attacks based on different fea-
tures. Our benchmark set includes multi-scale LBP [3], the
reflectance properties based [53], image quality assessment
based [54]color LBP [55], Haralick features [22], VGG-
16 model based [36], Chromatic Co-Occurrence of LBP
(CCoLBP) [56], and noise modeling based [57]. The experi-
mental results of all benchmark methods were obtained using
their public available codes. In addition, we have conducted
a controlled human-based detection experiment to test the
ability of human eyes in distinguishing wax figure faces from
real ones. In our controlled experiment, 20 volunteers (10
men and 10 women, aged between 23 and 55) were asked
to determine whether the face is real or not using our self-
developed program (as shown in Fig. 9). The classification
error rates were calculated and then their average is taken as
the final human-based detection result.
Table V compares the results of different detection schemes.
For Protocol I, we can see that existing face PAD methods
for 2D or 3D mask attacks suffered from severe performance
degradation with high detection error rates on WFFD, ranging
from 26% to 46%. We attribute the poor performances to high
diversity and super-realistic attacks in the introduced database.
Human based detection has achieved better result with ACER
of 16%, but with higher APCER than BPCER, suggesting
that more wax figure faces were mistaken for real ones.
Our proposed multi-voting scheme achieved the best result
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(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 7. Comparison of matching rates in different face recognition systems. (a) Openface, (b) Face++, (c) VeriLook SDK.
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 8. Comparison results of different fusion schemes under three protocols. (a) Protocol I, (b) Protocol II, (c) Protocol III.
Fig. 9. The program for human-based detection.
with 11.25% ACER. Similar performance differences can be
observed under the Protocol II. However, most algorithms
achieved higher error rates for this protocol. Such results are
reasonable since recording the real faces and wax figure faces
in the same scenarios with the same camera results in less
difference between real and fake faces. Therefore, it is more
difficult to detect the presentation attacks in this homogeneous
setting, which is consistent with the results in Table III.
The overall results under the Protocol III of different
face PAD methods have large differences, with the error
rates ranging from 7.82% to 48.67%. The best ACER was
achieved in the proposed multi-voting fusion scheme due to
the highly discriminative and complementary features, which
significantly outperformed other algorithms and human based
detection. In terms of the BPCER, the human based detection
obtained the lowest value of 15.31%, slightly better than the
proposed method. Besides, the CCoLBP features [56] also
achieved better results, with all error rates lower than 30%.
E. Failure case analysis
Based on the detection results on WFFD, we further show
and analyze the failure cases to have a deep understanding of
both detection methods and database.
Features used in the proposed method. In Fig. 10, we
have shown the Venn diagram for the failure cases of the
three single features used in our method (SqueezeNet, ResNet-
50, and MB-LPQ). It can be seen that they achieved different
failure cases in detecting the 920 faces in the testing subset
of Protocol III, but only 33 were wrongly classified by all
three features, implying the good complementary properties
among them. We have also shown these 33 failure cases in Fig.
10, which visually illustrate the challenge with distinguishing
between fake faces and real ones even for human eyes.
Additionally, we note that more real faces were mistaken
for fake ones (highlighted by the green dots in Fig. 10); by
contrast, only around one third of failure cases mistaken wax
faces by real ones (marked by the red dots in Fig. 10).
Human-based method. We have also analyzed the detec-
tion results of 20 volunteers as shown in Table V. We make
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TABLE V
DETECTION ERROR RATES (%) ON THREE PROTOCOLS OF THE WFFD
Method
Protocol I Protocol II Protocol III
EER APCER BPCER ACER EER APCER BPCER ACER EER APCER BPCER ACER
Multi-scale LBP [3] 33.17 31.22 31.22 31.22 36.62 37.32 33.45 35.39 34.56 33.33 32.92 33.13
Reflectance [53] 41.95 40.00 52.19 46.10 44.37 50.70 44.37 47.53 44.78 46.01 46.22 46.11
Image quality [54] 35.50 30.50 39.50 35.00 38.85 39.23 43.46 41.34 41.30 36.96 43.26 40.11
Color LBP [55] 33.17 30.24 36.10 33.17 37.32 36.62 41.90 39.26 36.81 35.38 35.79 35.58
Haralick features [22] 32.19 25.85 37.07 31.46 38.38 41.55 24.65 33.10 36.81 36.40 32.92 34.66
VGG-16 based [36] 45.85 50.73 41.95 46.34 48.94 40.14 52.82 46.48 48.67 45.19 49.28 47.24
CCoLBP [56] 29.50 26.50 26.00 26.25 28.08 24.62 34.23 29.42 28.04 26.52 29.13 27.83
Noise modeling [57] 52.50 63.00 45.50 54.25 58.85 58.46 59.61 59.04 56.09 58.69 49.98 54.33
Human-based / 20.14 11.86 16.00 / 32.97 17.97 25.47 / 27.39 15.31 21.35
The proposed 11.50 12.00 10.50 11.25 12.00 8.08 19.23 13.65 11.67 7.82 15.64 11.73
Fig. 10. The failure cases in feature based anti-spoofing detection. The left
shows the Venn diagram of failure cases associated with three features; and
the right shows the exemplar images in Protocols I and II. Note that images
with green dots are real faces (but mistaken for wax faces), while images with
red dots are wax figure faces (but mistaken for real faces).
the following two observations. First, human-based detection
performs worse than machine-based for all three protocols,
which implies that real vs. wax detection is nontrivial for
layperson. However, we note that this is partially due to the
lack of training in 20 volunteers. With more experience, human
observers tend to perform better in spoofing detection. Second
and more interestingly, when compared against machine based
detection, human based method was more likely to mistake
wax figure faces for real ones for both protocols, as shown in
Fig. 11 (there are more red dots than green dots). This is in
sharp contrast with what we have observed for machine-based
method in Fig. 10 (there are more green dots than red dots).
VI. CONCLUSIONS
To address the limitations in existing 3D face presentation
attack databases, we have constructed a new database (WFFD)
composed of wax figure faces with high diversity and large
size as super-realistic face presentation attacks. The database
will be made publicly available to facilitate the improvement
and evaluation of different PAD algorithms. Extensive experi-
mental results have demonstrated the vulnerability of popular
face recognition systems to these attacks. In particular, we
Fig. 11. The failure cases with high probabilities in human based anti-spoofing
detection. Similarly, images with green dots are real faces (but mistaken for
wax faces), while images with red dots are wax figure faces (but mistaken for
real faces). Note that humans mistake more wax figure faces for real faces
(red dots) than the other way around.
have observed that several existing PAD methods fail in the
task of detecting real faces from wax figure faces, demon-
strating the challenges when wax figure face are used for
3D attacks. We have developed a multi-voting fusion scheme
based on three discriminative and complementary features,
which significantly outperformed not only current state-of-
the art face PAD methods but also human-based detection.
Through detailed analysis of failure cases, we have found
that machine-based and human-based methods suffer from
different types of errors.
It should be noted that the best performance achieved by
the proposed multi-voting scheme still has the error rate of
over 10%. Super-realistic wax figure faces are indeed difficult
to distinguish from real ones even for humans. We envision
that motion based (instead of appearance based) anti-spoofing
methods, such as head movement or blink detection, will de-
serve further study in the future. In view of recent advances in
generative adversarial network (GAN)-based video synthesis
(e.g., talking Mona Lisa and DeepFake), even motion based
anti-spoofing might be foiled by more intelligent spoofing.
And there have been already a flurry of works on detecting
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DeepFake [58], [59], [60]. As many people believe, the arm
races between spoof and anti-spoofing will never end.
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